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Abstract 
The results of a theory for verification of nuclear materials balance 
data are presented. The sampling theory is based on two diversion 
models where also a combination of models is taken into account. 
The theoretical considerations are illustrated with numerical examples 
using the data of a highly enriched uranium fabrication plant. 
Das Ziehen von Stichproben zur Verifikation von Materialbilanzen 
Zusammenfassung 
Eine Theorie zur Verifikation nuklearer Materialbilanzen wird in ihren 
Ergebnissen dargestellt. Die stichprobentheoretischen Untersuchungen 
werden anhand zweier Materialentwendungsmodelle durchgeführt, wobei 
die Entwendungsmodelle auch kombiniert werden. 
Die theoretischen 
illustriert, wobei 
Überlegungen werden mit einem numerischen Beispiel 
die Daten einer Fabrikationsanlage für hoch 
angereichertes Uran verwendet werden. 
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1. Introduction 
In a previous paper /1/ the state of the theory of the verification of 
nuclear materials accountancy data was presented. Data verification 
procedures for Model A (falsification of all batch data in case of 
falsification) and for Model B (falsification of only a part of the 
batch data) both for attribute and for variable sampling, and combined 
materials balance and data verification test procedures were applied 
to the data of a highly enriched uranium fabrication plant in order to 
determine the efficiency of the safeguards system, namely the 
probability of detecting a diversion of a given quantitiy of nuclear 





the lack of analytical formulae for Model B and the variable 
case, the previous paper suffered from two deficiencies. 
the optimal sample sizes needed for the distribution function 
D-statistic for the data verification could not be determined 
for Model B, thus, the attribute formulae were used. Second, it was 
not possible to analyze the use of the two different measurement 
methods available, namely destructive and nondestructive analysis. In 
the meantime, the optimization problern of ~1odel B and the variable 
sampling case has been solved /2/, therefore, it was considered 
reasonable to analyze the available data once more with the better 
tools. 
In this paper, only the data verification aspects are discussed as the 
MUF-test as well as the combined (D,MUF)-test have not been improved 
from the theoretical point of view. Furthermore, only the variable 
sampling case is considered, as all seals are controlled, and as all 
measurement methods contain random measurement errors which cannot be 
neglected. In the second chapter those plant data are presented in 
short which are relevant to the data verification procedures. In the 
third chapter the new theoretical results and, tagether with them, 
their application to the plant data are given in order to avoid 
repetitions. 
The numerical calculations contained in this paper are performed with 
the help of computer codes which have been developed in the framework 
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of a diploma work at the Hochschule der Bundeswehr Hüneheu /3/. Fig. 
1-1 gives an overview of the structure of the study. Because of their 
size these codes have not been reproduced here, they can, however, be 
obtained upon request from the authors of this study. In this diploma 
work, also the combined (D,MUF)-test, in other words, the efficiency 
of the whole materials accountancy data verification system has been 










Structure f or Jhe Study of Data erification 
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2. Plant Data Used for the Numerical Calculations 
The theory that will be outlined in the subsequent chapter is applied 
to inventory data of a nuclear material fabrication plant. The plant 
under consideration is the NUKEM fabrication plant in Hanau, Federal 
Republic of Germany. As this plant has been described in major detail 
in earlier papers (/1/,/4/), here we only give a condensed description 
of the facility. 
The main production activity of the NUKEM plant in terms of the flow 
of highly enriched uranium is the fabrication of fuel elements for 
material testing reactors and for pebble bed high temperature 
reactors. There exists an accounting system that has been run since 
1975 on the basis of an electronic data banking system. This system 
enables the plant operator to produce at any time physical inventory 
listings for all material on storage. As there does not exist a 
stationary production state in the NUKEM plant, it is not possible to 
give representative figures for throughput and inventory. Instead, in 
/1/ a concrete inventory period, lasting from October 1977 to April 
1978, had been selected. In this paper, again these data will provide 
the basis for the numerical calculations. We will consider only the 
verification of the inventory data because it represents an especially 
important part of safeguards: Flow measurement data sometimes can be 
verified by comparing skipper and receiver data, but there is no 
alternative that can replace inventory data verification with the help 




inventories are stratified according to chemical, 
geometrical viewpoints; only the U-235 data are 
Table 2-1 the slightly adjusted data of the initial 
physical inventory of the inventory period mentioned above are listed. 
In Table 2-2 the relative standard deviations of the rough, i.e., 
nondestrucive measurement methodes are shown, including the time 
necessary to verify the data of a single batch. We assume that the 
plant operator and the inspector use the same instruments, or at least 
the same type of instruments which means that both their measurements 
have the same uncertainties. 
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In Table 2-3 the relative standard deviations for the fine, i.e., 
destructive measurement methods are listed. We assume that these 
methods can be applied in classes 4,5 and 6 of the initial physical 
inventory, as classes 1 and 7 represent initial products. In class 8 
there are different kinds of material and not a single measurement 
method to verify these data. In classes 2 and 3 we have seal checks 
and we do not break the seals if they are all right. 
Table 2-1: Physical Inventory Data from Beginning Inventory. 







Weight per Item ! 
1 UF6 
2. MTR, RHF Elements 
3 HTR Elements 
4 Fuel Plates 
5 Fuel Rods 




































~-----~---------------------- ------------ ------------- --------------------
Total 1334.5 
~'f) 
380 batches with 1000 items per batch. 
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Table 2-2: Relative Standard Deviations (SD) for rough (nondestructive) 
measurement methods. 
-· --------"----,.-·---·· 
Class Measurement Random error Systematic error Time needed to verify 
method SD ( % ) SD ( % ) one item (min) 
1 Seal check - -
2 Seal check - -
3 Seal check - -
41) ~-scanner 0.2 0.1 
51) ~-scanner 0.3 0.2 
6 Sb-Be 5 2 
7 Sb-Be 5 2 
8 Sb-Be 20 20 
l) The standard deviations in classes 4 and 5 seem to be a little 
optimistic, but because the quantities are small compared to the 
total amount of material our results should be still valid. 
Table 2-3: Relative Standard Deviations (SD) for fine 















l) This colurnn indicates only that we assumed the same inspection 










3. Verification Effort Optirnization 
According to the rnodel agreernent /5/ an inspector, sent by the 
safeguards authority to the plant under consideration, verifies on a 
randorn sarnpling basis the rnaterials balance data reported by the plant 
operator. Forrnally, he perforrns a statistical test in such a way that 
he tests the null hypothesis H
0 
- no data falsification - against the 
alternative hypothesis H
1 
- falsification of the data - corresponding 
to a certain arnount of nuclear material. 
In the following, we first consider the case that the operator uses 
- if at all - only one class specific data falsification procedure and 
that the inspector uses correspondingly only one rneasurernent rnethod 
for the verification. Thereafter, we extend these considerations to 
the case that both, operator and inspector, use two different 
falsification and rneasurernent rnethods. 
3.1 Tests with one Class Specific Measurernent Method 
As already rnentioned, we have to consider fine and rough verification 
rnethods with the help of which fine and rough falsifications of data 
shall be detected. Fine rnethods are provided by chernical or so-called 
destructive assays (DA); rough rnethods are so-called nondestructive 
assays (NDA) which rnake use of the radiation of nuclear material. 
In this section we assurne that the operator perforrns - if at all -
either a fine or a rough falsification of the rnaterials accountancy 
data, and furtherrnore, that the inspector knows this which rneans that 
he uses either the fine or the rough rneasurernent rnethod for the 
verification of the data reported to hirn. 
Let us introduce now the following class specific entlties which 
describe the problern to be analyzed in the following: 





set of material classes 
set of batches in the i-th class CIA. I=N.), 
1 1 ' 
effort (time or rnoney) for the inspector's rneasure-







set of batches in the i-th class the data of which 
are verified by the inspector (A~ c A., lA. i=n.), 
1 - 1 1 1 
class specific falsification of one batch datum in 
the i-th class 
set of batches in the i-th class the data of which 
are falsified. 
Furthermore, let Y .. be the random variable describing the measurement 
1J 
result of the operator for the material content of the j-th batch of 
the i-th class, i=l ... k, j=l ... ~ .. It is written as 
1 
(3.2) Y .. = T .. + e0 .. + d0 . for i=l. .. k, j=l. .. N., 1J 1J 1J 1 1 




ist the true U-235 content before any falsification, eOij 
measurement error, and d
0
i the class specific systematic 
error. We assume that the measurement errors are 
independent and normally distributed random variables with zero mean 
values and known variances: 
(3.3) E(e0 .. )=E(d0 .)=0, i=l ... k, j=l ... N.; 1J 1 1 
2 var(e0 . . )=o0 ., i=l ... k; j=l ... N.; 1J r1 1 
cov ( eo .. 'eo. I • I )=0' i' i I =1. .. k; j ~ j I ; j 'j I =1. .. N.; 
1J 1 J 1 
2 var(d0 .)=o0 ., i=l ... k; 1 S1 
cov(e0 .. ,d0 .~)=0, i~i
1 ; i,i 1 =l ... k, j=l ... N .. 
1J 1 1 
Let us assume now that the inspector verifies n. of the N. batch data 
1 1 
with the help of independent measurements. Let X .. , i=l .. k, j=l ... n. 
1J 1 
be the random variable describing the measurement result of the 
inspector for the material content of the j-th batch of the i-th class 
(for simplicity we assume that after a random selection procedure the 
batches are rearranged in such a way that the first n. batch data are 
1 
verified). If no data are falsified, we get for the null hypothesis H0 
(no data falsification) 
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(3.4) X .. = T .. + e 1 .. + d1 ., i=l. .. k, j=l. .. n., 1J 1J 1J 1 1 
where 
measurement 
is the random measurement error, 
error of the inspector. Aga in 
and dii the systematic 
we assume that the 
measurement errors are independent and normally distributed random 
variables with zero mean values and known variances (which may be 
different from those of the operator): 
(3.5) E(e1 .. )=E(d1
. )=0, i=l. .. k, j=l. .. n. 











,,,,)=0, i,i'=1 ... k; j-#j'; j,j'=1 ... n.; 





., i=1 ... k; 
1 S1 
cov(dii'dii')=O, ifi'; i,i'=1 ... k; 
( d ) -o · '"" · ' · · '-1 k cov e
1 
.. , I . , , 1 ,.. 1 ; 1, 1 . . . , 
1J 1 
j=1 ... n .. 
1 
Under the alternative hypothesis H
1
, that the batch data of the set Ar 
are falsified by the amount ~., we have 
1 
dli 
. Ax A~ (3. 6) T •. - J..l. + elij + JE . n 1J 1 ' J J 
X •• = for 
1J 
T .. + eiij + d . j '*' A~ n A~ 1J I1 J J 
In the following we specify the falsification strategies. We consider 
two models which we call Models A and B. It should be noted, however, 
that these two models do by no means exhaust all falsification 
possibilities. 
3.1.1 Model A 
We call Model A that set of falsification strategies where all N. 
1 
batch data of the i-th class are falsified by the class specific 
amount ~i' This means 
(3.7) 
y 
IA.I=N. or r.=N. for i=1 ... k. 1 1 1 1 
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Let us assume that the operator intends to divert the total amount M 
of nuclear material by means of data falsification. This means that he 
has to observe for the single falsifications ~. the boundary condition 
1 
(3.8) 
Let us assume furthermore, that the inspector has the total effort C 
at his disposal. This means that he has to observe for the sample 
series n. the boundary condition 
1 




The problern of the inspector consists in optimizing the probability of 
detection 1-ß(n,~), where g'=(n1 ... nk)' ~'=(~ 1 ... ~k)' for a given 
false alarm probability a, with respect to n under the boundary 
condition (3.9) for any set ~ subject to the boundary condition (3.8). 
In other words, he has to solve the following minimax-problem 
(3.10) max min (1-ß(n,y.)), 
n Y. 
with the boundary conditions (3.8) and (3.9). 
As all measured results entering the decision procedure of the 
inspector are disturbed by measurement errors, the data may be 
evaluated with a test procedure. The inspector is not interested in 
estimating the true values T .. , but only in the true differences 
1J 
between the operator's and his data. Therefore he will construct the 
test with the help of the differences 
(3. 11) Z .. = Y .. 
lJ 1J 
X .. , i=l. .. k, j=l. .. n. 
1J 1 
which are according to our assumptions independent and normally 
distributed with known variances 




1,2, .• ,k 
1,2, •. ,n; 
If one treats the sample series ni' i=1 .. k, as continuous variables, 
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then the solution of the problern (3.10), and also the solution of the 
optimization problern 
min max (1-ß(g,g)), 
.l! !!. 





















c ( ( 6 
e 
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<I>(0(C) - u ) 1-a 






/E) 0 ri e 
c (6 N 0 • /E)2 + 6 
N2 02 
e re se' e e e e 
02 . + 2 02. 2 + 02 . 
Or1 ~Iri' 81 00si Is1 
/E: + 02.) . CN. 1 1 S1 
1 
and where t(.) is the normal distribution function and U. its inverse. 
The optimal test procedure is the so-called D statistic 
(3. 14) D E 
iEK 
* N. (E Z .. )/n. 
1 . lJ 1 
J 
which has been proposed earlier by Stuart /6/ who gave heuristic 
arguments for its use. 
It should be noted that the solution (3.13) of the optimization 
problern (3.10) includes the solution of one further optimization 
problern which has not been mentioned explicitly, namely the 
1,2, ... ,k 
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determination of the best test procedure in the sense of the Lemma of 
Neyman and Pearson /7/. 
~ .. 
From (3.13c) and (3.13d) we get the effort CA which is necessary for 
* achieving the guaranteed probability of detection 1-ßA which we call 
here simply 1-ß: 
(3.15) C* 
2 r-- 2 
(u
1
_,.. + U *) •0: N. 0 • •vE:.) "' 1-ß ~ ~ r~ ~ 
In case of destructive analysis we have e.=e for i=l ... k, therefore we 
~ 




-::--o-:-n__ N. 0 • 
L: N 0 ~ r~ 
e e re 
M 
((L: N 0 ) 0 . + N. 0 2 .) 
e e re r~ ~ s~ 
1 2 
0(n) =- (L: N. 0 .) + 
n i ~ r~ 
L: N. 2 
i ~ 
n* 




3. 1. 2 ~fodel B 
We call Model B that set of falsification strategies, where only 
r. (~N.) 
~ 1 batch data of the i-th class are falsified by the class 
specific amount ~.: 
1 
(3.17) IA~I=r. for i=1 ... k. 
~ 1 
If the operator intends to divert the total amount M of nuclear 
material by means of data falsification, then he has to observe for 
the single falsifications ~. and for the sample series r. the boundary 
1 1 
condition 





In this case the optimization problern of the inspector is 
(3.19) max min (1-ß(g,,r,}D) 
and where ~'~ and ~ are subject to the boundary 
conditions (3.9) and (3.18). 
Contrary to the case of Model A it is not possible to give a complete 
analytical solution for this problem. If one takes the test statistic 
(3.20) D l: N.(l: Z .. )/n. 
~ ~J ~ 
~ J 
which was proven to be optimal in case of Model A, also as test 
statistic for Model B, then one can solve the limited problern (3.19). 
If one treats the sample series n. and r,, i=1 ... k, as continuous 
~ 1 
variables, then the solution, which is also solution of the problern 
max min (1-ß(u,r,~)) 
l! ll,J:. 
is under the assumption 
(3.21) 















E N 0 e e re 
N./2 1 
2M 




0 . r1 
*2 *2 





N. 0 . 1 r1 




l:" N. a . 1 81 
N. 0 ri 1 
;;:: 
1 
i 1,2, ... ,k 
N.2 02. 
1 81 
2 2 and where 0 . and 0 . are again given by (3.13e). 
r1 81 
From (3.22d) we get the effort C~ which i8 nece88ary for achieving the 
guaranteed probability of detection 1-ß; which we call here simply 
-15-
1-ß: For a<0.5 and ß<0.5 we get 
= 
(3.23a) 
A2 2M K L /M 2 H+B (K 2H-L2)(H-1) 
+ ---------------------------------
B2(K2-L2)2-2 M2 B(K2+L2 )+M4 










B = 2: 
iEK 






N. 0 . VE.' 
1 r1 1 
N. o . , 
1 r1 
+ 
(The capital letters A,B,D,H and K have already been used in a 
different meaning, but there should be no confusion, as they are used 
in the meaning given here only as arguments of ß and in connection 
with C.) 
In case of destructive analyses we have E .=E for i=l ... k, therefore we 
1 
get with n=C/E from (3.22): 
n 
(3. 24) n.* 
~ l: N CJ 
e re 
e 
* * * 
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N. a . 
~ r~ 
~ 1,2, .. ,k 
ri, ~i' i=1, .. ,k, and 1-ßB are the same as (3.22b,c and d), 
*2 <I: 2 L: N.2 02. 0 DO N. CJ .) /n + iEK ~ r~ iEK ~ s~ 





+ M /n 
~~ 
and furthermore, for n we get the same expression as that given by 
(3.23a), where Ais replaced by D. 
3.1.3 Camparisan 
The guaranteed probability of detection for Models A and B can 
according to formulae (3.13c) and (3.22d) be written as 
(3.2Sa) * 1-ßA/B 
where H is given by 
M- ;;,2~~~-~-;_-;, U 1-a 
<P (____,,".".,_2=--=-==,_..----) 
JA H/C + B 
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A 
(3.25b) H for Model 
B 
and where A,B and D are given by (3.23b,c and d). Both probabilities 
(3.25a) are monotonically increasing functions of the effort C with 
the limiting probability 
(3 0 26) 
For given values of the amount M of material to be diverted and 
inspection effort C the operator can influence the guaranteed 
probability of detection only via the choice of the Models. As the 
t-function is a monotonely increasing function of its argument, we 
have 
It should be noted, however, that Model A is taken only if the 
argument of the t-function in (3.24a) is negative, i.e., if the 
probability of detection is smaller than 0.5. If we assume this to be 
an irrelevant case, then always Model B will be taken by the operator. 
On the other hand it should be kept in mind, that the solution for 
Model B holds only under the assumption (3.21), i.e., under the 
assumption 
This means, that if this solution holds, then Model B is better for 
the operator than Model A. In general terms, we can interpret these 
results as follows: 
amount of material, 
If the operator intends to divert only a small 
then he will use Model A because such a small 
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falsification might be covered by the measurement errors. If he 
intends to divert large amounts, he "plays vabangue", he falsifies 
only a few data by relatively large amounts and hopes that they will 
not be chosen for verification by the inspector. 
In Figures 3-1 through 3-6 and 3-7 through 3-12 examples for the 
probabilities of detection 1-ßA and 1-ßB as functions of the amount M 
to be diverted and fixed verification effort C for the initial .. 
inventory (data given in Table 2) with fine and rough measurements are 
given. One observes that the change of the Model, which is better from 
the operator's point of view, occurs at 1-ß=O.S; the corresponding 
value of M depends on the value of C. If one compares the figures 
which belang to different C values, one gets a qualitative idea for 
those regions of values of C, where the probability of detection 
changes significantly, in other words, where an increase of the 
verification effort still is justified. 
Let us still consider the question of the choice of the best Model 
from the point of view of the operator, if the amount M of material to 
be diverted and the probability of detection, defining H according to 
(3.25b). One can show that for given values of 
* * the value of CB is always larger than that of CA which means that also 
under the boundary condition of a given probability of detection 1-6 
the operator will chose Model B. 
In Figures 3-13 through 3-15 and 3-16 through 3-18 for the initial 
inventory data given by Table 2-1 examples for the inspection efforts 
CA and CB as functions of the amount6 M to be diverted with fixed 
probability of detection are given. If one compares the figures which 
belang to different C values, one gets a qualitative idea for those 
regions of values of the probability of detection, where the effort 
changes significantly. 
In Tables 3-1 and 3-2 for the initial inventory data given by Table 
2-1 sample series, amounts tobe diverted and standard derivations for 
Models A and B for fine and for rough measurements are given for fixed 







* (Mod. A) n 
* (Mod. B) n 
* (Mod. A) ~ 









* n (Mod. A) 
* n (Mod. B) 
* (Mod. A) ~ 
* ~ (Mod. B) 
Model A: 
Model B: ono 
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* * Salutions for ni' ~i and the corresponding standard 
deviations using Tab. 2. I, Hodel A and B and destructive 
analysis 
M=35, ß=0.05, CA=0.293, CB=4.06 
4 5 6 
3. 2 E-5 i. I E-4 I .815 E-1 
I .6 E-5 I .4 E-4 7.26 E-2 
8.312 E-3 I. 604 E-3 2.83 E-1 
1.152E-I 2.223 E-2 3.921 
I. 908 E-4 I. 25 E-3 I .429 
3.975 E-4 2.608 E-3 2.254 
10.63 
3.546, oDI 17.73 
Salutions for n.*, ~.* and corresponding standard deviations 
1. 1. 
using Tab. 2. I, Model A and Band nondestructive analysis 




I. 65 I 
2.496 
2.708 E-6 





I .98 E-4 
3. 186 E-1 
4.818 E-1 





I .027 E-1 
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2 I. 36 
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Figures 3-1 to 3-12: 
Detection probability 1-ß as a function of amount of 
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Figures 3-13 to 3-18: 
Inspection efforts CA and CB as functions of the amount 
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3.2 Tests with two Class Specific Measurement Methods 
In this section we assume that the operator will - if at all - falsify 
the material accountancy data by a total amount M of material, which 




which correspond to rough and to 
fine falsifications. We assume, furthermore, that the data are 
falsified by class specific amounts in a rough resp. fine way, and 
that the composition of the total falsification is chosen by the 
operator in a way which is optimal for him. 
Let us introduce again the following class specific entities which 
describe this problem: 
(3.27) 




















set of material classes, 
subset of K in which fine falsification and 
verification takes place, 
subset of K in which rough falsification and 
verification takes place, 
set of batches in i-th class CIA.I=N.), 
1 1 
effort for fine measurement for one batch in i-th class 
effort for rough measurement for one batch in i-th class 
set of batches in i-th class the data of which are verified 
set of batches in i-th class the data of which are verified 
with rough method (A~( 2 ) c A., IA~( 2 )1=n~ 2 )), 
1 - 1 1 1 
class specific fine falsification of one batch in i-th class, 
class specific rough falsification of one batch in i-th class, 
set of batches in i-th class which are falsified finely, 
set of batches in i-th class which are falsified roughly. 
As again the inspector is not interested in estimating the true values 
T .. , the testwill be based on the differences 
1J 
-41-
(3. 28) Y •• - X •• (1) 
lJ lJ 
'EAx(l) 
• J i i = 1,2, •.• ,k, 1 = 1,2 
where Y .. is given by (3.2). Let X~~) resp. x~:) be the result of the 
1] 1] 1] 
destructive (fine) respec~ively nondestructive (rough) measurement of 
the inspector of the material content of the j-th batch of the i-th 
class. Under the assumption that the operator does not falsify data we 
have 




i 1,2, .•. ,k, j 
where T .. is the true material content e0(~~ the random measurement l.J 1J 
error and d (1) the 
Oi class specific systematic measurement error. We 
assume that the measurement errors are independent and normally 
distributed random variables with zero mean values and known 
variances: 
(3.30) F( (1)) ' eiij E(d~l)) 0 1 • i 1,2, ..•. ,k, j 1,2, ... , ni' 
2 
(1) (1) 




1 E ' l.J 1. 
(1) ( 1') 






i 1,2, •• ,k 
(1) d(~')) 0 i ~ i I 1 i: 1 1 cov(dli I1 1 or 
1 
1 • 2 




1 • 2 
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Under the alternative hypothesis H1 , that the batch 
are falsified by the amount ~im), m=l,2 we have 




T .. - ~· ~m)+ er .. (1)+ dr~l) jEA~(l)n A~(m) 
1J 1J 1J 1 1 1 
x:. ~1) for 
1J 
T •• + c/~) + dril) jEA~(l)n (A~(1)n 
1J 1J 1 1 
1 1 '2; m 
Again, we consider Models A and B. 
3.2.1 Model A 
We consider the case that the operator falsifies - if at all - all N. 
1 
batch data in the i-th class by a class specific amount M~l), 1=1,2; 
1 
i=1,2 ... k, i.e., we consider Model A. As we assume that fine and rough 
falsifications of one batch datum cannot occur at the same time, 
A~( 2 ) = ~ for i=1 ... k. 
1 
The operator can falsify the batch data of a given class either finely 






Table 3-3: Falsification possibilities of the operator with respect to 
the initial inventory data given by Table 2-1. G means rough, 




Possibility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
+---------------+----------------------------------+ 
Al G G G G G G G G 
A2 G G G F G G G G 
A3 G G G G F G G G 
A4 G G G G G F G G 
AS G G G F F G G G 
A6 G G G G F F G G 
A7 G G G F G F G G 
AB G G G F F F G G 
+---------------+----------------------------------+ 
Let us assume that the operator intends to divert the total amount M 
of nuclear material by means of data falsification. This means that he 
has to observe for the single falsifications ~~l), 1=1,2 the boundary 
condition 













is the total fine resp. rough falsification. The 
verification effort of the inspector is composed of the effort c
1 
for 
fine measurements, and the effort c2 for rough measurements, 








1 1 '2. 
As the effort c
1 







cannot be combined to one single effort. 
In order to solve the problern of optimizing the overall probability of 
detection 1-ß(n(l) ,nC 2) ,~Cl) .~( 2 )) with respect to n(l) and n( 2 ) under 
the boundary condition (3.33) for any sets ~(l) and ~( 2 ), subject to 
the boundary condition (3.32), i.e. in order to solve the problern 
(3.34) max 





( 1 - ß (~ ( 1) ' (2) ( 1) n ' .!:!.. 
with the boundary conditions (3.32) and (3.33), one could in principle 
proceed as outlined in section 3.1.1, namely to determine first the 
best test in the sense of the Lemma of Neyman and Pearson. As this 
would lead us to one single test and as the fine and the rough 
measurement data of the inspector are available at different times, we 
proceed here in a different way. We construct two best tests for the 
comparison of the operator's fine and rough measurement data with the 
boundaries of given values of Ml' and Cl 1==1,2. Because of the 
independence of the two test statistics the total guaranteed 
* probability of no detection, ßtA' is given by 
~'< * ß~A (3.35a) ßtA = ßFA 
#~ 
ß~A where ßFA and are the single guaranteed probabilities of no 
detection. The total no false alarm probability is 
(3.35b) 
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where a 1 , 1=1,2 are the single false alarm probabilities which we will 
choose a 1=a2
=0.05 in the numerical examples. 
The 
1 ~ ... 
optimal sample series n. of the inspector and the optimal single 
1 
. . . 1 ~ ... 
fals1f1cat1ons v. of the operator i=1 ... k, 1=1,2 are then agairr given 
1 
by the set (3.13) of formulae where allrelevant quantities get the 
index 1=1,2. The same holds for the efforts c
1 
necessary for achieving 
a guaranteed probability of detection; they are given by formula 
(3.15) for 1=1,2. 
It should be noted that there exist further reasonable possibilities 
for constructing test procedures for the two sets of data z~~)' 1=1,2, 
1J 
which have been discussed in /8/, which will, however, not be used 
here. 
3.2.2 Model B 
Let us now consider Model B i.e., that case where r~ 1 ) batch data of 
1 
the i-th class are falsified by the amount v~ 1 ), 
1 
and where r~ 2 ) batch 
1 
data of the i-th class are falsified by the amount of v~ 2 ), i=1 ... k. 
1 
Also in this case one batch datum cannot be falsified finely and 
roughly at the same time, 
We know however, from formula (3.22b) that - in case of the twofold 
test procedure which we discussed before and which we will use again -
the optimal 
i=1 ... k which 
values of the sample series r. are given by N./2 for 
1 1 
means that contrary to Model A here also both fine and 
rough falsifications are possible within one class. 
If the operator intends to divert the total amount M of nuclear 
material by means of data falsification, then he has to observe for 
the single falsifications v~l) and r~l)' i=1 ... k, 1=1,2, the boundary 
1 1 
condition 
(3.36) M E 
iEK 
(r. (1) (1) + r. (2) "· (2)) = M + 
1 )Ji 1 ~1 1 M2 
For the sample sizes i=l. .. k, 1=1,2, we have agairr the two 
-46-
boundary conditions (3.33). 
In order to solve the problern of optimizing the overall probability of 
detection 1-ß(n( 1),n( 2 ) ,~( 1 ),~( 2 ) ,r( 1) ,rC 2)) with respect to n( 1) and 
n(2 ) under the boundary Londitions (3.33) for any sets 
( 1) ( 1) (2) (2) subJ'ect ~ ,r ,~ ,r , to the boundary condition (3.36), i. e., 
in order to solve the problern 
(3.37) 
with the boundary conditions (3.33) and (3.36), we proceed as in the 
foregoing section. We construct two best tests for the comparison of 
the operator's data with the inspector's fine and rough measurement 





according to (3.33) and (3.36). 
Contrary to Model A here the two test statistics are in general not 
independent as one operator's da turn may be verified both by the 
inspector's fine and rough measurement. Therefore, a factorization of 
the total probability of no detection and of the total no false alarm 
probability in the sense of formulae (3.35) does not hold in general. 
In the following, we derive the exact expressions for the total 
detection and false alarm probabilities based on the D-statistics, and 
show at the hand of numerical examples that the dependence of the two 
statistics can be neglected in some cases. 
The D-statistics for the two tests are 
(3.38) Dl I: N. 2:: Cv· · - X. ~l))/n~l) 
iEK 
1 . ··1J 1J 1 
J 
,1=1,2. 
where Y .. is given by (3.2) and x(l) by (3.31). Let 
1J 1J 
n. be the nurober 
1 
of bat eh data in the i-th class which are verified both by fine and 
rough measurements. If we assume that within one class no batch datum 
is verified twice as long as there are still data, which have not yet 
been verified, then we have 
(3.39) n. 
1 
. n~ 1 ) + n~Z) - N. l 1 0 1 1 if N. > n~ 1 ) + n~ 2 ) 1 1 1 otherwise 
i = 1,2, •.. ,k. 
-47-





elementary calculations . 
(3.40a) 
n. 
I: ( N~ • --,-,...----1.----r::-o-
iEK 1. n~l) + n. ( 2 ) 
1. 1. 
002 . + N~ 002 . ) 
r1. 1. s1 
If 
(1)2 (1)2 
we call oDO and oDl the variances of n1 , 1=1,2 under the null 














( 1) (2)) cov(D 1,n2)/(0DO • 0DO Po 
(3.40b) cor(D 1
,D2) und er 
(1) 
cov(D 1,n2)/(0D1 • 
(2)) 0D1 ""' p1 




is under the null hypothesis H
0 
(3.41a) 1 2rr 

























(x1-M1) 2p1(x1-M1)(x2-M2) (x2-M2) exp ( + )) 2 0(1) (2) 2 ( 1-p 1 ) (1)2 (2)2 0
D1 D1 • 
0D1 0D1 
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Therefore, the total no fal8e alarm probability 1-a, which i8 defined 
a8 
81 82 
















e = 1 '2 
i8 explicitly given by the formula 
u 
1-al 





























In Figures 3.19 through 3.21 the probability of detection with and 
without (i.e vanishing) correlations are given. In addition, in 




are shown. We see 
that for values of the total fine falsification H1 , which are not too 
small, we can neglect the dependence between the two test statistics 
D
1 
and D2 , which, as already mentioned, exists only for 
n (l. )+ n(
2. )> N. f 1 . 1 k or at east one 1= , ... , . 
1 1 1 
As a consequence, we proceed as outlined in the foregoing section. We 
write the total probability of no detection, ß:B' in the form 
~'( ~~ ~'r 
(3.46a) ßtB = ßFB ßGB 
~~ 
and ßGB are the single guaranteed probabilities of no 
detection, and accordingly the total no false alarm probabilities 1-a1 









=0.05 in the numerical examples. 
-~-
Figures 3-19 to 3-21: 
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The optimal sample sizes 
c~.,.) 
of the inspector and n. 
1 
the optimal sample sizes 
1 ~ ... 
and single falsifications r, 
1 
1 ;'" 
l.l. 'i=1, ... k, 
1 
1=1,2 are then again given by the set 
(3.22) of formulae, where all relevant quantities get the index 
1=1,2. The same holds for the effort C necessary for achieving 
a guaranteed probability of detection, they are given by formula 
(3.23) for 1=1,2. 
3.2.3 Camparisan 
If one neglects the correlation between the two test statistics 
in Model B, then the total probability of no detection can 
both for Model A and B be written as 




































N. • a . 
1 r1 
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Both probabilities of detection are monotonically increasing functions 
of the efforts c
1
, 1=1,2, with the limiting values 
(3. 48) * ß tB 









influence the total probability of detection only 
by choosing Model A or B. With the abbreviations 
(3.49) 
1 '2' 
one sees immediately: For zl and z2 greater zero, the Operator will 




smaller zero, he will choose Model B. If 
zl and z2 have different signs, then the Operator chooses Model B, if 
the absolute value of the negative argument of the one t-function is 
larger than the absolute value of the positive argument of the other 
t-function, otherwise Model A. 
If the total guaranteed probability of detection is given, and if it 
is larger than the limiting value given by (3.48), then there does not 




) which can fulfill this. Lower 
boundaries for c
1 
1=1,2 are given by (3.23a) with 
(3.50) ßt/~(U1-a- Mm/ ~), 1 
m 
1, 2, m 3-1. 
Under the assumption 1
1
>0.5, 1=1,2 we calculate in the same way as in 
section 3.1.3 that the minimal values for the efforts c
1
, 1=1,2 are 
always larger for Model B than for Model A 
-60-





inspector for given total guaranteed probability of detection and 
given total amount M of material to be diverted via data 
falsification, both for Model A and ~· Comparing Figures 3.25 through 
3.27, one recognizes the influence of the diversion strategy (A4,A7,A8 
of Table 3-3). Comparing Figures 3.27 through 3.29, one recognizes the 
influence of the value of the total diversion. One clearly recognizes, 
in addition the higher verification effort in case of Hodel B. 




M and 1-ß 




) of the total falsification M, and 
furthermore, sample sizes and single falsifications for Model A. The 
comparison of Tables 3-4 through 3-9 shows the influence of the total 
falsification M. 
Tables 3-10 through 3-12 show for selected pairs of values of c
1 
and 
c2 , M and 1-ß the optimal distribution (M1 ,M2 ) of the total 
falsification and furthermore, sample sizes and single falsifications 
for Model B. The comparison of these tables shows the influence of the 
total falsification M. 
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Figures 3-25 to 3-29: 
Optimal efforts c
1 
and c2 for given guaranteed 
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Tables 3-4 to 3-9: 
Optimaldistribution (M1,M2) of the total falsification 
M, sample sizes and single falsification for Model A 
and selected values c1,c2 ,M and I-ßt. 































10.0 c2 =596.0 ßt = 0.05 
5 6 7 
l .000 E+O 
1. 045 E-1 
1. 815 E-1 
7.260 E-2 
1.988 E-I 8. 81 1 E+ 1 
2.152 E-5 1.149 E-2 
2.970 E-4 9.334 E-3 
1. 980 E-4 3. 734 E-3 
-·-- ~ L_____ ___ - ~--- - ----
M
1 
= 3. 14 











Tab. 3-5: c1 = 10.0 c2 = 608.0 
Class 
n 

































= 10.24 ~ = 31.7 





7. 260 E-2 




































2. 828 E-1 
7. 908 E-6 
3.200 E-5 






c2 61 1. 0 ßt = 0.05 
5 6 
5.477 E-2 9.661 E+O 
4.964 E-5 1.066 E-1 
2. 100 E-4 1.815 E-1 













































7. 149 E-6 
3.200 E-5 




10.0 c2 99.7 ßt 0.05 
5 6 7 8 
5.477 E-2 9.601 E+O 
4.487 E-5 9.638 E-2 
2. 100 E-4 1 . 815 E-1 
1. 400 E-4 7.260 E-2 
-.J 
~ 
I. 484 E+ 1 l. 777 E+O 
1. 329 E-;2 4.374 E-2 
9.334 E-3 3.734 E-2 


































= SI. 1 ßt 
5 6 
5.477 E-2 9.661 E+O 
4.029 E-5 8.655 E-2 
2.100 E-4 1. 815 E-1 
1.400 E-4 7.260 E-2 
MI 2.63 

















































= 33. 1 ßt = 0.05 
5 6 
5.477 E-2 9.661 E+O 
3.640 E-5 7.818 E-2 
2.100 E-4 I. 815 E-1 


















Tables 3-10 to 3-12: 
Optimaldistribution (M1,M2
) of the total falsification M, 
sample sizes and single falsifications for Model B and 
selected values c1,c2 ,M and I-ßt. 





































2. 100 E-4 













2. 126 E+l 
1.655 E-1 

































































I. 400 E-4 
8. 109 E-2 
6.546 E-4 
2.970 E-4 































Tab. 3-12: Cl 
Class 
















































162.0 ßt 0.05 
6 7 8 
2. 126 E+l 
9.515 E-2 




6.039 E+O 1. 859 E+ 1 2.225 E+O 
6.475 E-1 2.355 E-2 9.418 E-2 
2.567 E-I 9.334 E-3 3.734 E-2 







It is shown in the foregoing part that game theoretic considerations 
lead to a reasonable analysis to determine sample sizes for the 
verification of materials balaces. It is feasible to use twol different 
measurement methods for the verification of operator's data. The 
formulae for inspector sample sizes can be easily implemented on a 
computer. Only two extreme diversion models have been used. 
Nevertheless, theoretical and numerical considerations give plausible 
about diversion strategies under certain parameter assumptions 
conditions. Especially the fact that the more general Model B can be 
treated leads to the conclusion that a distinction in attributed and 
variable sampling seems not necessary. The analysis enables several 
parameter studies. 
For single verification methods a dependence between amount of 
falsification and inspection effort for a given probability of 
detection is presented. That means for a certain verification effort 
i.e. a limitation that is given in terms of time or money we can find 
an amount of falsification that is detected with an acceptable 
detection probability. 
If we look at the situation where two measurement methods are used by 
the inspector to verify operator's data we can illustrate the 
relationship between the inspection efforts for both methods under a 
given detection probability. These areas can be isolated where 
reasonable combinations of inspection efforts should be. Furthermore, 
the dangeraus areas for the inspector are demonstrated. That is these 
areas where a reduction of inspection effort for one method leads to 
necessity of large addition of the other method to attain a certain 
detection probability. This is a point of view that is very important 
for a inspection authority. 
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